GREGORY: Hello, dear viewers. This is Hour of Interview, I'm Gregory Antimony, and it’s my pleasure to introduce today’s guest — Sergey Auslander, a well-known Israeli journalist and writer. Sergey, thank you for being here.

SERGEY: Thank you for having me.

GREGORY: I'd like to begin our conversation with your childhood. Two cities — Khabarovsk and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky. How did they shape your youth?

SERGEY: I was born in Khabarovsk. My parents were finishing their medical studies there.

GREGORY: In Khabarovsk?

SERGEY: Yes, they studied at the medical institute in Khabarovsk. When I was one year old, we moved to Kamchatka. I grew up there, went to school there. After that, I enrolled at a university in Vladivostok, where I studied for five years. Then I went to Khabarovsk — not exactly "returned," because I had no memory of it, didn’t really know the city. I lived there for five years after graduation, worked, and started my professional career there. Later, I moved back to Vladivostok. I never returned to Kamchatka after school.

GREGORY: I see. So what was it like — growing up in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky?

SERGEY: Just a typical Soviet childhood — with one exception: Kamchatka is an incredibly exotic place. There are volcanoes, earthquakes, and bears. Right across the street from our house was wilderness — a dense, wild forest. You’d cross the road and be in complete, untouched nature. You could walk for a hundred days and not see another human. Technically, it’s a peninsula, but it feels like an island — the only way to get there is by plane. A flight to Moscow took nine hours, which back then felt completely surreal. We used to say we were "on the mainland" — everything beyond Kamchatka was “the mainland.”

GREGORY: That’s exactly what we said in Magadan.

SERGEY: Same idea. Magadan’s like an island too — like Sakhalin. Honestly, the whole Russian Far East feels that way. Like in Alaska, where they say “the lower 48” — we called it all “the mainland,” a distant, almost mythical place.

GREGORY: So you really experienced Soviet life?

SERGEY: More than enough. I started university under the Soviet regime.

GREGORY: I’m especially interested in your childhood impressions. Were you a calm child or not so much?

SERGEY: More or less, like all normal kids. I had my share of adventures. You know, the Kamchatka wilderness left its mark on how we entertained ourselves. For example, we’d go into the forest, climb trees — those were our kinds of games. Overall, I was an average Soviet kid — a mix of a bit of a troublemaker and a regular boy. Nothing too unusual, except that I grew up in Kamchatka. And when I would visit my grandmother in Belarus, I’d tell the local kids stories and they wouldn’t believe me — like how we could jump off a five-story building into the snow. That really happened. Snowdrifts would pile up to the third floor, and we’d jump off the roof into them, and then our friends would dig us out. All of that sparked wild curiosity among my peers in Belarus, because they had never experienced anything like that.

GREGORY: Your parents were doctors, right?

SERGEY: Yes, but they’re retired now.

GREGORY: Right, that makes sense with their age. Did they try to steer you toward following in their footsteps and continuing a kind of medical dynasty?

SERGEY: Oh yes, they definitely tried. They wanted me to get into medical school — they had this dream of a dynasty. They really wanted me to become a doctor, but I didn’t really want that. Honestly, part of it was just teenage rebellion — if your parents push too hard, you push back. And they really did push. Also, we had terrible chemistry classes at school — it was taught so badly that I didn’t understand anything, and to this day I still don’t. So I realized that with my level of chemistry knowledge, there was no way I’d pass the entrance exams. To catch up, I would’ve needed to start from scratch with a tutor and basically learn chemistry from the beginning. I just didn’t want to do that, so I resisted and refused to go to medical school. Many years later — when I was in my 40s — I began to think that maybe I should have gone along with it. I probably would have made a good doctor.

GREGORY: Interesting.

SERGEY: But it was too late by then. You can become a journalist after turning forty if you’ve been a doctor — but you can’t become a doctor at forty if you’ve been a journalist.

GREGORY: Right. From what I’ve gathered in our conversation so far, journalism wasn’t something you planned?

SERGEY: Absolutely not — total shot in the dark.

GREGORY: You were never interested?

SERGEY: No, not at all. I didn’t even know such a profession existed. In my life, I had maybe met a journalist twice before that. Once, some reporter from the local radio came to our school and asked us something—I don’t even remember what it was about. And the second time, I don’t remember exactly, I saw a film crew on the square during the May Day parade—something like that—there was a journalist with a microphone saying something. Just standing there. That’s it.

GREGORY: I got the impression that your journalism career went quite successfully—both in Russia and later after your emigration to Israel.

SERGEY: Yes, more than that. I really can’t complain. Everything was sort of step by step. Again, I went through all the stages of a journalism career—at least in my case. I worked in newspapers, I worked on TV, I even managed people for a while—thankfully, not for long. I managed both relatively large and very small teams. There was a news department at a local TV company in Khabarovsk, where I had around 30 people under my supervision. And I also headed the Far East bureau of Channel One, where there were, if I remember correctly, about six people, including me.

In general, I even got to work as a cameraman—that's where I learned to shoot. So that was kind of a curveball in my biography. Everything happened gradually, but I eventually reached my current state. Now I’m basically a journalist on YouTube working solo. I don’t have a team—just one other person I work with. That’s my entire crew: me and him. And maybe one more person who does the thumbnails. That’s it. This is what I do. My son, Junior, once said to me, “Dad, you’re a really interesting case—you sort of left the profession, but also stayed in it. You’re doing something new, but it’s still the same thing you’ve always done.” That’s how it turned out.

GREGORY: Those kinds of transformations…

SERGEY: Exactly, those kinds of twists and transformations, but still within the same profession.

GREGORY: When we were walking out of the auditorium after the talk with you, I overheard a couple on the stairs—husband and wife, I think—and the husband said rather sarcastically, “Well, he kind of glossed over his time at Channel One. It’s hard for me to imagine a journalist who worked at Moscow’s Channel One and didn’t mess up his biography.”

SERGEY: Well, somehow, I didn’t mess up my biography—or at least I think I didn’t. Look, everyone worked somewhere. There are a lot of decent people now living abroad who used to work in Russian media. I just happened to leave in time.

GREGORY: As I understand it, back then there weren’t yet all these severe propaganda issues?

SERGEY: When I left—no, not even close. It was 2008—before the war with Georgia. I left at the peak of what you could call a flourishing period in journalism, when many things were still possible in Russia. There were still some opposition channels around, and you could speak your mind—though not on Channel One, of course. On Channel One, you could never say anything, let’s be honest. But overall, you could still get away with a lot. But I realized that this “getting away with things” window was going to close very quickly. There was no point waiting for that to happen. It was time to leave. So I did.

GREGORY: You had assignments in conflict zones, right? Was that during the Second Chechen War?

SERGEY: Yes, it was the Second Chechen War. That was my first experience covering a war—it was during the Second Chechen campaign.

GREGORY: How long did you stay there? How long did that assignment last?

SERGEY: Two times for three weeks each, so in total I spent about a month and a half there — not counting a few short trips when I flew in, shot something, and flew right back out. Those kinds of short assignments happened, for example, in Dagestan. But the longer, proper field assignments — there were two, each lasting three weeks.

GREGORY: Since you spent quite a bit of time in a war zone, I assume you developed some understanding of how things are set up there. Would you say there are any analogies between the actions of Russian forces in Chechnya and those of the Israeli Defense Forces in Gaza?

SERGEY: I wouldn’t say there are many analogies. The only one that comes to mind is that what’s happening now in Gaza — this guerrilla warfare, insurgency and counterinsurgency — is similar to what was going on in Chechnya during my first trip there. That’s probably the most dangerous phase of any war, because you never know where an attack might come from, or what might explode under your feet. Even stepping on fresh concrete or asphalt can be risky. But overall, they were quite different conflicts. The war in Chechnya — especially the second one — as far as I understand, was launched purely to boost Putin’s approval ratings. I’m not sure there were any solid reasons behind it. I didn’t really dive into the politics at the time, but the general feeling was... well, with Israel you can more or less understand what they’re fighting for. But in Chechnya, by the time I got there, no one could really tell anymore what the Russian army was doing. It seemed like the army was mostly just guarding itself.

GREGORY: And that raid into Dagestan...

SERGEY: That’s what started it all. And it was totally unclear what they were doing there. The federal troops — or so-called federal forces — were probably the biggest danger to us, because they were scared of everything but heavily armed. And when someone is scared and armed — that’s a dangerous, unpredictable combination. Grozny, for example, was just horrifying — a dead city, completely destroyed. Total nightmare. And even back then it was already clear that Moscow had decided to "Chechenize" the conflict — to bet on one clan, the Kadyrov clan in this case, and let them handle things. The federal government would just support them with money, weapons, and force. The battles and skirmishes I was filming — they were mostly Chechens fighting Chechens.

GREGORY: Even back then?

SERGEY: Yes.

GREGORY: I didn’t know that. Okay, to sort of sum up your journalistic work before you moved to Israel, let me ask this: Did you personally encounter antisemitism during your life in the Soviet Union or in Russia?

SERGEY: Yeah, I did, but it was more of the everyday, casual kind. Like, “Fimka’s one of us — sure, he’s a Jew, but he’s a good guy.” Even within the family — some relatives from Ukraine — it came out occasionally. But it was all just casual, not malicious. When they found out my mother was marrying a Jew, they were shocked — like, “How can someone marry a Jew?” But once they met my father, everything was great. It turned into, “Dimka’s one of us — sure, he’s a Jew, but he’s a good guy.” That’s literally how they put it.

GREGORY: But it didn’t affect your career?

SERGEY: Not me personally. But a relative of mine who lived near Birobidzhan — he was deliberately failed at his entrance exams to the Khabarovsk medical institute. They told him directly: “We’re not training professionals for Israel.” That was around 1990, right at the end of the Soviet Union. He’s a year younger than me. My dad had issues too — in the '70s, when they moved to Kamchatka, there were very open, clear displays of antisemitism, and it affected his career. For me, personally, aside from some casual stuff, I didn’t really face it. The only thing was when I started working at Channel One — they told me to come up with a pseudonym. So I became Sergey Kosarev, in honor of my late grandmother. I used that name for several years, especially while working in Vladivostok.

GREGORY: Sounds a bit more... "neutral."

SERGEY: I guess so. I’m not sure why they didn’t like the name Auslender, but that’s what happened.

GREGORY: By the way, where is that name from? German?

SERGEY: I believe so. It’s from Yiddish. The Jewish side of my family — on my father’s side — comes from Ukraine. Chernihiv, Vinnytsia, those regions. Later, part of the family was exiled to the Far East to help build the Jewish Autonomous Region. That’s actually what saved them — and why I even exist. Those who stayed behind didn’t survive. The surname, I think, is German. After the expulsion of Jews from Spain, they settled across Europe, and in the Middle Ages were given various names. “Auslender” means “foreigner” in German. So it’s a name rooted in both Yiddish and German — and the languages are very close, as far as I understand.

GREGORY: Yes, they are, quite similar.

SERGEY: My grandmother spoke Yiddish and understood German. If someone spoke to her in German, she understood.

GREGORY: So what made you decide to stay in Israel?

SERGEY: There were several factors. The first was the very unpleasant story of my dismissal from Channel One. I’d rather not go into it — it’s long and messy. But to be honest, they treated me like garbage. Pigs, really. And they could’ve handled it so differently.

Anyway, they recalled me from Israel and offered me to come back to Moscow. I could’ve stayed in Moscow, and maybe my career would’ve gotten back on track. But I decided — after something like that, there was no way I could stay at the channel. Some things you just don’t forgive.

We had already spent two years in Israel. I was working as a foreign correspondent, my family was with me. Our first child was born there — and the second as well. My eldest son was born in Israel, technically as a foreigner and Russian citizen, and later repatriated with us. So he’s both a sabra and a new immigrant — kind of a rare case.

By then, we had gotten to know the country, started to understand it, and we really liked it. Israel suited us very well.

The third factor was that "itchy feeling" — the one that tells you: it’s time to leave. I felt we had to get out right then, even though nothing on the surface seemed urgent. Well, except for the NTV takedown. But most people dismissed it as “a business dispute between oligarchs.”

GREGORY: A dispute between commercial entities...

SERGEY: Exactly. But I saw it from the inside, and I knew — things were going in a very bad direction. Even in my worst nightmares, I couldn’t imagine just how bad. But I had this gut feeling: if you can leave, do it.

Family and friends told me I was crazy: “Why? You have a flat in Moscow, five minutes from the metro, just 45 minutes door-to-door — that’s nothing by Moscow standards. Your parents live nearby, everything’s perfect…” But I couldn’t shake the feeling — we had to leave.

GREGORY: In all your years in Israel — did you ever doubt your decision? Did you ever regret choosing Israel?

SERGEY: Not once. On the contrary — that feeling of uncertainty, sitting on unpacked suitcases and wondering if you did the right thing — it passed very quickly. I stopped saying “they” when talking about Israel, and “we” about Russia. Some people I know have lived here 20 years and still do that. I switched almost immediately. I realized: this is my home. As they say in Israel — this is the center of my life. This is where I’ll live.

Sometimes I think: what if we had stayed? My kids would be growing up in Russia. Just the thought makes me break into a cold sweat.

​

Excerpt from Sergey Auslender’s program, May 10, 2025:

I remember WWII veterans visiting our school in the 1980s. They were still relatively young — in their 60s. They spoke calmly, but you could see they didn’t really want to talk. What they’d been through was a massive trauma. And to now parade around saying “we can do it again” — that’s just obscene, in my opinion. But this is how the Russian regime works: they’ve privatized the victory, as someone aptly said. They took ownership of it — and now they ride it nonstop.

We remember who died in our families. My cousin David disappeared near Moscow in 1941. For decades he was listed as missing. In the ’90s, search teams found his remains. His name is now engraved on a memorial in Khabarovsk — which also includes names from the Jewish Autonomous Region. I discovered it by accident and later confirmed it was really him.

Another cousin, Sasha — on my father’s side — also disappeared in the war. No one ever found out what happened. My grandfather fought against Japan.

Every family has its own private tragedy.

And to dance on those graves — especially with Russian flags, in Israel — that, to me, is a mystery. Though I’m quite sure: it’s all very well-funded.

 

GREGORY: I have a question for you — what don’t you like about Israel?

SERGEY: What really irritates me in Israel is the widespread unprofessionalism — blatant amateurism in many areas. That’s why we have so many problems. Ministers don’t do their actual jobs — they only engage in politics, and in its ugliest form. The Minister of Communications talks about “the purity of Jewish blood” when he’s supposed to deal with communications. The Minister of Transport — does everything but transport. And sometimes that’s even a good thing: the moment they start doing their job, things actually get worse. There’s also a huge divide in society. It’s a wound that isn’t healing — it’s just getting deeper.

GREGORY: What kind of divide? Left and right?

SERGEY: I wouldn’t even divide it like that anymore. It’s not just left and right. It’s ultra-religious vs. secular, it’s pro-Bibi vs. anti-Bibi. We literally have two sects: “only him” and “anyone but him.” There’s also this big question: who are we — Jews or Israelis? What kind of state are we building? A democratic one? Or a clerical-nationalist one, where only halachic Jews live and everyone else is just support staff? There are so many layers of division. And no one is trying to heal them — on the contrary, it’s all getting worse.

GREGORY: And on the everyday level?

SERGEY: You get used to daily life quickly. I’d prefer cleaner streets, of course, but I live in a town where it’s more or less tidy. Some places are really dirty — that I don’t like. Cleanliness standards are just different. But I follow the rule of the outstretched hand: if you see a piece of trash, pick it up and throw it away. I always do that. People don’t clean up after their dogs — that’s awful. But it’s a cultural issue. The state, too, has started to distance itself from people. It used to really care about its citizens — especially compared to Russia, where the state lives in its own galaxy and people in another, and whenever they intersect, it only gets worse. Israel wasn’t like that — but now that distance is growing. And everything’s incredibly expensive, of course. But that’s a personal choice — if it’s too expensive here, go somewhere cheaper. Just understand, cheaper places have their own problems. The world’s big. I, for one, don’t want to leave.

GREGORY: A friend of mine — he’s passed now — used to say: “Yes, there are a lot of things that annoy me about Israel. But the most important truth is: if things go bad for Jews anywhere in the world, they can always come home.”

SERGEY: Absolutely true.

GREGORY: Now, about your illness. You’ve written openly that in fighting cancer, the key is the person themselves. Could you explain what you meant?

SERGEY: If you don’t believe you’ll recover — you won’t. No matter how much your family helps, how good your doctors are — it won’t work unless you have that inner determination. You have to go through the pain yourself. Someone can hand you a glass of water, but they can’t carry your pain. They can give you a pill — but it might not help. You have to be mentally ready for suffering. But if you accept it — you can get through it. Otherwise, if you tell yourself “I have cancer, I’m done” — that’s it, you’ve lost.

GREGORY: I remember my first impression of Israel — it was the youth. So different from young people in other countries. What do you think about that?

SERGEY: What struck you about them?

GREGORY: Their openness. Their self-confidence — and their confidence in the future…

SERGEY: Totally agree. That’s exactly how I feel too. Israel is a country of children and the elderly. Kids there are surrounded by love from birth. No one humiliates them, adults talk to them as equals. That wasn’t the case for us growing up. It affects your self-esteem. And better to have too much of that than too little. I really like Israeli youth. They’re much better off than we were at their age. And thank God for that.

GREGORY: What was your first impression of the Israeli army?

SERGEY: Everything felt very human. I filmed a lot inside the army. Compared to the Russian army — even with my limited exposure — there, everything reeks of hierarchy and abuse. In Israel, it’s different. A lieutenant and a soldier may be the same age. You can enlist as a private and leave three years later as a captain. And hazing simply doesn’t exist — it’s not even possible. No one will allow themselves to be treated that way — not legally, not in practice.
I remember being at the military cemetery of the Oketz unit — that’s the IDF’s canine special forces. They bury combat dogs who died in action with full honors, like soldiers. It was one of the most moving things I’ve ever seen. I visited their base twice — it’s not far from where I live. It left a deep impression.

GREGORY: What kind of dogs are they?

SERGEY: These days, it’s mostly Belgian Shepherds. They used to work with different breeds, but now it’s primarily Belgians. One of the training exercises is this: the instructor carries a sandbag around the training grounds all day. The idea is that if the dog is wounded in combat, you must be able to carry it out on your back. That’s why they train — to simulate carrying the weight of an injured combat dog.

GREGORY: That’s really interesting. I’ve never heard of dogs being given roles like that.

SERGEY: It’s not just a role. They’re, how should I put it… actual service members. Soldiers.

GREGORY: That’s exactly what I meant…

SERGEY: These dogs are soldiers. Yes, they walk on four legs, but they’re treated like real soldiers — not as property, not as some combat unit, not as machines, but as comrades-in-arms. After their service ends, they’re not “decommissioned” like equipment — they’re adopted into families. There’s actually a waiting list to take them home.

GREGORY: The Israel Defense Forces include people from different ethnic backgrounds, right?

SERGEY: You could say that, yes.

GREGORY: What about Arabs living in Israel?

SERGEY: It’s more complicated. Arabs aren’t required to serve, but they can volunteer. Some do. Take Hasan Alyan, for example — I think he’s Bedouin — he became a Major General. In 2014, he commanded the Golani Brigade and was wounded. Now he coordinates government activity in the Palestinian territories.
There are others too — they go through security screenings by the Shin Bet, and if cleared, they’re accepted. Arabs serve, Bedouins serve, Druze serve, Circassians too.

GREGORY: To my surprise, while preparing for this interview, I found out that in 2022 the IDF had its first Muslim Arab woman promoted to the rank of captain.

SERGEY: That’s quite possible. The presence of women in the army has grown significantly. There are women commanding warships, some have become generals, battalion commanders — maybe even brigade commanders by now. In fact, on October 7, 2023, all-female tank crews fought in actual combat — I believe that was a historic first.

 

Excerpt from Sergey Auslender’s program, April 19, 2024:
In general, history shows that appeasement never works. Just remember September 1938: Chamberlain returned from Munich waving a paper signed by Hitler and declared, “Peace for our time.” A year later, the most devastating war in history began.
Iran has a clear strategy, a clear goal — and they’re pursuing it with no regard for nuclear deals or peace agreements. Meanwhile, the West keeps saying, “We want to avoid a major war” — and ends up facing one again and again. Same with Hamas. And then came October 7.

​

GREGORY: Since you brought up October 7 — after those tragic events, did you lose faith in the Israeli army?

SERGEY: No, I didn’t. Though, of course, the rose-colored glasses came off — not just regarding the army, but Israel as a whole. A good friend of mine put it well: “Israelis slept peacefully until October 7 because they had no idea what was really going on in the army.”
The myth of “the strongest army in the Middle East” was shattered. Yet, interestingly enough, the IDF is still the strongest military force in the region. But that attack — it caught us off guard, right in plain sight.

GREGORY: Yes, and alongside the myth of military strength, there was also the myth of Israel’s unmatched intelligence capabilities…

SERGEY: You could say that. But the threat level remained high anyway. Same as with Operation “Pager” — whether in Lebanon or Iran — things happened right in plain sight. But this one, this attack — we managed to sleep through it, even though it happened right under our noses. Literally behind the fence.

GREGORY: I know you’ve spoken publicly on this a lot, but as of today — have you formed a complete picture of how and why this happened?

SERGEY: In my view, it’s a highly complex situation. You can’t just say, “Here’s one person responsible, let’s throw him in jail.” No. This was a collective failure. Starting with the Prime Minister — and yes, fans of the current PM hate when I say this, they call me a leftist and whatever — but in our system, the Prime Minister carries ultimate responsibility. For everything.

At the same time, the military’s at fault too — from battalion commanders on the ground all the way up to the Chief of Staff. SHABAK, our internal security service, also failed. Everyone did.

There was this whole concept: “money in exchange for quiet.” We’ll give money to Hamas, and they’ll stay calm in Gaza. Supposedly it worked — they wouldn’t attack us, because it just wouldn’t be worth it. Plus, people said — look how small they are compared to us, it’s no contest.

But that was the mistake — a classic one. Assessing intent instead of capability. “Hamas won’t attack, because...” — and then everyone builds explanations around that. But the real question should’ve been: “Can Hamas attack?” If yes — we prepare. If they don’t — great. But if they do — we’re ready. You always have to prepare for the worst-case scenario.

The army completely missed that point. Everything related to military readiness around Gaza was a disaster. And it’s truly a miracle that Hezbollah didn’t join in simultaneously with Hamas. If they had coordinated the way it was originally planned — a two-front attack from north and south, covered by missile strikes from Gaza, Lebanon, maybe Syria — I don’t know what kind of country we’d be living in now. We just got lucky that something went out of sync on their side.

GREGORY: How long do you think Hamas was preparing this operation?

SERGEY: About ten years. Since 2014 — after that war, which at the time was the longest: 56 days. It was called “Operation Protective Edge.” I was down south the entire time — I remember it well. I saw the tunnels, the rocket fire.

Even then it was clear — Hamas was no longer just a fringe terrorist group. They fought back fiercely. They weren’t what they used to be. Their tunnel systems grew, their rockets improved.

And Yahya Sinwar — he’d been released in the Gilad Shalit prisoner deal in 2011 — after that 2014 war, he realized Hamas needed to rebuild its military wing. He started turning the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades into a full-fledged army: military districts, divisions, battalions, a chain of command, a general staff, heavy weapons. And that’s what they did.

The operation was called “Jericho Wall.” In Arabic it had a different name, but Israeli intelligence completely misinterpreted it. They thought it was an unrealistic plan. They decided — for Hamas — that it wouldn’t work. But Hamas was preparing for years. And in the last few years, they trained specifically for this very attack. And we didn’t respond at all.

GREGORY: It’s hard to wrap your head around.

SERGEY: It’s impossible to comprehend. That’s why you get so many conspiracy theories — that leftist generals made a deal with Hamas, or that Netanyahu was in on it. All of that — nonsense. We just slept through it. Plain and simple.

And there were multiple distractions: unrest in the West Bank, shifting intelligence focus, plus Iran, plus Hezbollah. In the end, we overestimated Hezbollah — and underestimated Hamas.

There’s this common phrase, “savages in flip-flops.” Like Israel is this mighty rock, and it was taken down by guys in sandals. But that’s not accurate. During the breach, these weren’t savages — they were a light infantry brigade. A highly trained, mobile, well-armed unit. They had MANPADS, anti-tank missiles, coordinated tactics.

It’s a miracle they didn’t reach Ashdod, or Tel Aviv, or Be’er Sheva. They absolutely could have. The Nova music festival — the people who were killed there, in a way, their bodies blocked the path to Be’er Sheva.

It was an early Saturday morning, the roads were clear — they could’ve reached Be’er Sheva in an hour from where the breach happened. But they hit the festival and got caught up in the bloodshed. Otherwise, they’d have gotten there.

GREGORY: And what about those claims — maybe from the far-left — that Russia might have played a role in the planning? Is that grounded in reality?

SERGEY: I don’t have that information. What we do know is that Iran was involved. Captured fighters said during interrogations that they left Gaza via tunnels into Egypt — shout-out to Egypt — and then continued on to Iran. There, they trained on IRGC bases in sabotage and other tactics.

So yes, Iranian involvement is documented. As for Russian weapons — I think some were found, but not a significant amount. In Lebanon, yes — a lot. In Gaza — unclear.

There’s also that theory that the attack was a birthday gift to Putin — since it happened on October 7, his birthday. Personally, I think that’s absurd. I don’t believe it.

What’s more relevant is how quickly Russia chose sides in this conflict — very openly. That much is clear. But direct Russian involvement in the attack hasn’t been proven.

GREGORY: I think you once said — or wrote — that Netanyahu isn’t exactly the hero of your novel...

SERGEY: No, he's not a hero.

GREGORY: Why not?

SERGEY: In my view, he’s overstayed his time. Being in power too long is always damaging — especially in a complex country like Israel. You start accumulating backdoor deals, compromises, flatterers. A whole entourage forms around you.

Unfortunately, our political system is built in such a way that the Prime Minister ends up focusing not on solving strategic problems — and Israel has more than enough of those — but on political survival. He spends all his energy keeping the coalition intact. And right now, his coalition partners basically have him by the throat — he can’t do anything without their consent.

Take Itamar Ben-Gvir, for example. He’s our Minister of National Security now — a complete fringe figure who, not so long ago, nobody would even talk to. Now he’s a minister, constantly threatening to bring down the coalition.

Forget political responsibility. Instead of working, it’s all: “Give us this, or we’ll walk.” It’s become a grotesque Middle Eastern bazaar — utterly repulsive — and on top of that, the sheer amateurism of it all. And for that, yes, I blame Netanyahu. Not just because of who surrounds him, but because he handpicked those people. That’s on him.

No doubt, he’s an intelligent man. He has plenty of achievements — from his combat service in Sayeret Matkal to major economic reforms. But now, in my opinion, he’s slowly turning into a kind of dark genius — not the root cause, but a symptom.

In Israel, we have two political cults: “Only Bibi” and “Anyone but Bibi.” The Bibi camp thinks he’s a messiah. The anti-Bibi camp believes that once he’s gone, everything will be perfect — milk and honey flowing. That’s nonsense. Remove him, and someone else will come. There’s no guarantee they’ll be better. Could be worse. The real issue is the system itself — it's devoured itself like a snake eating its own tail. It’s completely degenerated. So yes — that’s why I say he’s no hero of mine.

GREGORY: But people vote for him, right? It’s fair elections, isn’t it?

SERGEY: Absolutely. He’s not in power through fraud or manipulation. He was elected legally, through proper democratic procedures. But when his supporters claim he was elected by a democratic majority — that’s not true. One third of voters is not a majority. What he did was build a coalition — a coalition made up of all kinds of shady characters.

People who voted for Likud last time essentially voted for Shas, for Ben-Gvir’s party, for all of them — whether they wanted to or not. For example, they voted for a policy where ultra-Orthodox Jews don’t serve in the army. But most voters don’t see these connections. For them, it’s just “Pro-Bibi” or “Anti-Bibi.” I’m in neither camp, though both sides constantly try to label me as the other.

GREGORY: I’ve heard a theory — a strange one — that the internal division in Israeli society, especially around the judicial reform, played a role in the October 7 events. Do you think there’s any truth to that?

SERGEY: It could’ve been a signal to Hamas — a sign that Israeli society was deeply fractured. And it was. The divisions were real and severe. Hamas might’ve thought: now’s the time, Israel is weak. That was their biggest mistake — to believe that internal division meant weakness.

Yes, we were split. But we were not weak.

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Excerpt from Sergey Auslender’s program, June 13, 2025:

The operation started — depending on the time zone — either very late at night or early morning, with airstrikes on Iranian military sites. First came attacks on air defense systems, then IRGC and army bases. Then came targeted assassinations — apartments in residential areas where high-ranking Iranian officials and military personnel lived were hit.

On April 12, President Trump had given Iran a 60-day deadline to reach an agreement. People mocked him — said he always moves red lines, extends deadlines. Like he did with Putin: two weeks, then another two weeks, and so on. But today is Day 61. The deadline has passed. Iran flat-out refused to comply.

We interviewed several experts — including MISHA BORODKIN — who told us negotiations completely collapsed. Iran declared it had completed the nuclear fuel cycle and would not halt uranium enrichment — which was the U.S.'s key condition. So talks fell apart entirely. Then the question became: what’s next? Will we strike first? Will it be a quick war or a prolonged one?

We still don’t know. It could be a short, intense conflict — over in days — or a long war of attrition. Maybe Iran launches 20 rockets a day, and we respond with strikes. It’s unclear. But one thing is clear: Israel is taking this seriously. The goal is to eliminate the Iranian threat — not just the nuclear one, but missiles, drones, military capabilities of all kinds. So we’re striking military-industrial sites too.

 

SERGEY: I remember a piece in Al-Akhbar — that’s Hezbollah’s paper in Lebanon. One of their operatives wrote: “Don’t believe them. Yes, Israelis are divided, even ready to tear each other apart. But the moment we strike, they’ll come together — and when they do, we’re screwed. An enraged Israel is terrifying. We know this, especially in Lebanon.”

But no one listened to him. And now — here we are.

GREGORY: I understand you're not a supporter of the idea that we should first finish the war and only then start analyzing and drawing conclusions. It seems to me you take a different position?

SERGEY: Not exactly. I would put it this way: before we go any further with the war, I want to understand what the contours of our victory are. I've said this since the beginning: we need a clear definition of what victory actually means. Where is the equivalent of the Reichstag over which we will raise our blue-and-white flag? There's no such symbolic target in Gaza. We're certainly not going to raise it over Tehran.

 

Excerpt from Sergey Auslender’s program, April 19, 2024:

For the past 15 years, Israel has warned about the Iranian nuclear threat — and rightly so. If Iran obtains nuclear weapons, it will spark an arms race in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, and others will want the bomb. The more players there are, the higher the risk of someone using it.

Back in the early 2010s — 2010, 2011, 2012 — Israel was, from an operational standpoint, ready to strike Iranian nuclear facilities. There were concrete plans, and they still exist and are updated regularly. But the leadership didn’t follow through. Partly because of American pressure, partly because the Israeli political and military establishment didn’t want a full-scale war.

That’s the classic policy of appeasement: “We won’t touch you, just behave yourselves.”

 

So today, again I ask — what does our victory look like? We have a phrase, nitsachon mukhlat, a total victory. But no one can explain what that means. And that frightens me. That’s why I insist we need to define clear criteria for victory.

GREGORY: So I misunderstood. I thought you were mainly calling for an investigation…

SERGEY: That goes without saying. A state commission should already be working. People often misunderstand what that is — especially supporters of the current coalition. They love to say, “Now is not the time.” Like our Ukrainian friends say: ne na chasi — let’s win first, then figure things out. But that’s nonsense. They'll do everything to avoid creating such a commission.

But its purpose isn't punishment — it’s not a tribunal. It’s not about leather coats and Mausers and locking people up. Its role is to produce recommendations. Recommendations only — not binding. What needs to be changed so this never happens again? The commission must identify the points of failure — and there were many, at every level.

What went wrong in protocols? In decision-making? Why did Shin Bet behave this way? Why did Mossad act differently? What about the government, the army? Down to the company and battalion commanders. A full report must be compiled. And of course, it will probably be classified to hell — just like the Agranat Commission after the Yom Kippur War. Only now, 50 years later, are some of those findings being declassified.

GREGORY: Sergey, tell me — were you personally surprised by the explosion of antisemitism after October 7?

SERGEY: Not really. We’ve seen similar waves before, after military operations in Gaza. This time it’s bigger, yes — but it’s also part of a coordinated campaign. Meanwhile, horrors are happening all over the world — Ukraine, Sudan — unspeakable atrocities. But no one even mentions Sudan. Try googling how many hits you get for Gaza vs. Sudan — the difference is astronomical. These things are driven by agendas.

GREGORY: What surprised me personally was the response in Western universities. From professors to students — and these are the people who will be tomorrow’s elites, in politics, in business, in law, in the U.S. and elsewhere. Isn’t that alarming?

SERGEY: Of course it is. But it’s not surprising when you consider how much money Qatar has poured into those institutions. It's completely explainable. And yes, these students will become lawyers, CEOs, politicians, ministers.

And when people say, “They’ll grow out of it, settle down, have families” — no, they won’t. Look at the elites in countries like Spain, which for decades has maintained a consistently anti-Israel stance. Look at what Scandinavian countries have become — Norway, Iceland, and especially Ireland. I mean, Ireland? Of all places? One of the most anti-Israel countries in Europe. How did that happen? The agenda slowly shifted.

GREGORY: Is there a difference between anti-Israel and antisemitic?

SERGEY: I believe there is. But the line is thin and blurry. For example, I saw pictures — I think it was in Montreal or maybe here in Toronto — where a pro-Israel rally took place right next to an anti-Israel rally, and among the anti-Israel protesters were ultra-Orthodox Jews opposing the State of Israel. Are they antisemitic? That would be absurd.

It’s complicated. In Israel, we’re too quick to slap the label “antisemite” on everyone. That’s not right. It dilutes the meaning of the term.

GREGORY: It’s just unintelligent.

SERGEY: Exactly. Throwing that label around indiscriminately is not only unhelpful — it’s dangerous.

GREGORY: There’s one topic I already mentioned when we met — it really concerns me. It’s the relationship between war-torn Ukraine and Israel, which is also at war. Why isn’t it working out?

SERGEY: Oh, I don’t know... Honestly, even before the war, those relations weren’t particularly close. Sure, there was some cooperation, diplomatic ties — everything looked perfectly normal. Ukraine had its own agenda. People often bring up that infamous pattern of Ukraine voting in favor of anti-Israel resolutions at the UN. I always said that doesn’t mean anything. First, the UN itself is basically useless nowadays. Second, my favorite example is Azerbaijan — they consistently voted for every anti-Israel resolution, and yet today they’re one of our closest allies.

GREGORY: A Muslim country.

SERGEY: A Shiite one, no less. And yet, everything’s fine. No one really cares about those votes, not as long as the U.S. has veto power in the Security Council. The rest — completely irrelevant.

Now, what I think Ukraine did wrong at the start of the war was the way they started demanding cooperation — demanding weapons. “Give us Iron Dome,” they said. I remember going on air and explaining: we don’t have enough batteries to protect all of Israel if a major war breaks out — and now it has.

Look, I completely understand Ukraine. They’re dealing with enormous national trauma. I never had any issue with that. I was just trying to explain why Israel couldn’t do more. Also, Israel’s attitude toward Russia has always seemed strange to me. I don’t really understand it — or, rather, the explanations I’ve heard are pretty unpleasant.

GREGORY: I mean, there were those “special” relations between Netanyahu and Putin, which clearly went beyond politics. At the very least, they seemed odd.

SERGEY: To me, they looked bad. It was always explained as a matter of national security: Russian troops were stationed in Syria, so Israel needed to maintain normal relations to ensure freedom of action. But I said back then — Russia can’t stop us in Syria. Our military capability there far exceeds theirs. It's not even close. They can’t do anything.

And now, that factor is gone. Those Russian bases in Syria are either empty or irrelevant. So how do we explain things now? Still, there’s this inertia — people keep repeating that Israel has "strategic interests."

Also, there’s the argument about the large Jewish community in Russia — that if Israel turns against Russia, they’ll be in danger. But what about the large Jewish community in Ukraine? They’re under constant Russian attack — and somehow that’s not seen as dangerous? I really don’t understand how all this makes sense to anyone.

GREGORY: But you know the capabilities of the Israeli army well. Are there any real — maybe not obvious — ways Israel could help Ukraine?

SERGEY: Well, what we see now is just the tip of the iceberg. Everything else is hidden. I know a lot that I can’t even talk about — things I was told in confidence. Let’s just say: in the corridors of Ukraine’s General Staff, you’ll hear people speaking Hebrew. That’s all I’ll say.

There’s been cooperation. Israel has delivered materials, humanitarian aid. Civil society helped, and the government too. Our ambassador, Misha Brodsky, provided generators — one of them could power an entire hospital. They set up a field hospital in Lviv. So yes, a lot has been done.

But Ukrainians understandably want more. Always more. And now we’re in our own war. We didn’t ask Ukraine for help, by the way. We’re fighting on our own. Yet cooperation still continues.

What’s surprising is that Ukraine’s experience with drones — both using and fighting them — is invaluable. And still, somehow, we’re not learning from that.

One of the things that shocked me during this war was the mindset of our generals. It’s exactly as Churchill said — they’re still preparing for the previous war. This rigidity of thinking, this arrogance — it was a real revelation for me.

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Excerpt from Sergey Auslender’s program, April 19, 2024:

There’s a concept called strategic deterrence — when both sides know that if one strikes, the retaliation will be disproportionately devastating. That’s what held things in place between Israel and Iran for decades.

In fact, we’ve been at war with Iran for about 40 years — ever since the Islamic Revolution. They’ve made us a target. We are the "Little Satan," the U.S. is the "Big Satan." We’re seen as Zionists, Western crusader proxies. They don’t even use the word "Israel" — they call us the Zionist entity, or the Zionist tumor, or something like that.

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GREGORY: Does the pro-Putin sentiment among what’s often referred to as the "Russian street" in Israel — which I know exists — play any role in shaping public opinion?

SERGEY: I wouldn’t say it’s a significant part, actually. Sure, they exist — just like in Canada, the U.S., or Australia, where I recently was. Those people — the ones we call vatniki, the pro-Putin types — they’re everywhere. Interestingly, in Australia, it’s often the descendants of White émigrés who support Putin — which really surprised me.

But anyway, they’re everywhere. In Germany, there are tons of them. In Israel, not so many — not as many as people think. And after the war in Ukraine began, they toned it down significantly. I even know people who switched sides — former Putin supporters who now hate him. Especially after Russia openly supported Hamas — that created serious cognitive dissonance for many of them. They were forced to choose a side.

But I don’t think they have much influence. In my opinion — no. The bigger issue is the strange attitude our government maintains toward Russia. Again, you can’t justify it solely by national security concerns. There are other reasons, I fear — ones we wouldn’t like if we knew them. But I’m not making accusations. I wasn’t there with a candle.

GREGORY: I want to bring up a subject that’s been floating around for as long as I can remember: Israel is constantly said to be losing the information war. From your perspective — this is your field, after all — is that true?

SERGEY: I’d say Israel has already lost it — completely, and spectacularly. And in a way, it was a technical knockout — we didn’t even show up for the fight. And the way we did engage, we would’ve been better off not trying at all.

But having spent time researching the topic, speaking to people, and digging into it, I came to the conclusion that we never had a chance — not even a slim one. Even with a professional team and a huge budget, we’d still have lost. It’s like trying to stop a tsunami with a cardboard sign — my favorite analogy. It’s just not possible.

Massive resources have been invested into the information war against Israel — huge efforts. That’s where the rise in antisemitism, the anti-Israel sentiment in universities, and all that comes from. Compared to that, Israel is like a mosquito — tiny and irrelevant.

GREGORY: I totally agree with you. I could name plenty of examples — even beyond the financial side. But you know, there’s this paradox — the widespread belief that the world’s top media is controlled by Jews. I’m sure you’ve heard that theory.

SERGEY: Well, apparently the wrong kind of Jews. I mean, take government channels and official spokespeople. My friend Dima Hendelman — he was Netanyahu’s public relations advisor, and I think he still is — he once said they tried to buy ad space in major global media outlets for public awareness campaigns. They wouldn’t even take our money. Not even for paid public service announcements.

And that says a lot. If you can’t even pay to tell your story — how are you supposed to wage an information war? It’s simply not realistic. Totally impossible.

GREGORY: But is this topic even being discussed seriously in Israeli government circles?

SERGEY: Not really. The general political consensus in Israel seems to be: “We lost that war, so let’s not even bother with it anymore.” That’s one. Two — Israel is extremely self-centered when it comes to information. That’s something I noticed right after I moved there and started working. The country is deeply focused on itself. What happens outside barely registers — everything is viewed through the lens of internal politics.

If you ask an Israeli expert to give an interview — either to a local outlet or an international one — he’ll choose the Israeli one. Why? Because it boosts his visibility inside Israel, not abroad.

I remember this story well. It was 2008, during Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. Rockets were flying. A friend called and said: “A rocket landed near Sderot, near a kibbutz — I forget which one. It’s still sticking out of the ground. Go film it!”

I was working for three channels at the time — Russian, Ukrainian, and I think Georgian. The combined audience of those three channels was at least 10 times bigger than the population of Israel. We went there — and there were two or three Israeli news crews by the kibbutz entrance. Then the IDF press office arrived — it was a closed military zone, so they were in charge — and they said: “Only Israeli channels allowed.”

I tried to explain: “Guys, I represent three foreign media outlets. Look — here’s my press pass, here’s another. We’re about to show the world this isn’t Israel committing genocide in Gaza — it’s Gaza attacking us with rockets.”

And they said: “No, no, no,” — with those completely blank eyes. What kind of information war can you talk about after that?

​

Excerpt from Sergey Auslender’s program, June 15 2025:

So, there were alerts. The first one sounded in the north, in the greater Haifa area — a major metropolitan zone. The alert went off there, and as usual, we all got notifications on our phones. The entire country received them simultaneously, by the way — it doesn't matter if your phone is connected to a network or not. It works differently somehow. The point is, you get the alert and can’t turn it off. It comes with this horrible, screeching sound — purposefully unpleasant. The message says something like “In ten minutes it will start,” and sure enough, ten minutes later the sirens started blaring in Haifa and the surrounding areas.

Rockets were launched in the direction of the oil refinery — we have only one in Israel, and it’s in Haifa. That’s not a secret, I’m not revealing anything classified. I know the rules and the law. So everything I say is cleared for publication.

Anyway, they hit the village of Tamra with one of their rockets. I was just recently up north — I had a talk in Ma’alot — and we drove right through Tamra with my producer. Literally through it. And that’s where the rocket hit. It destroyed a house. Almost an entire family died — four women: a mother and three daughters. As far as I know, they were Arab Muslims. Tamra is a village inhabited by Israeli Arabs. And that’s where the Iranians hit with their rocket. Many were injured, some were pulled out from the rubble, and unfortunately, four people died.

It reminds me of the Second Lebanon War, when Hezbollah was firing rockets at the north. I was working there at the time, I remember it clearly. One of their rockets hit a village and killed children — Arab Muslim children, their fellow believers. And NASRALLAH, who’s now no longer with us, calmly said on camera, “They became martyrs for the great cause of resistance to the occupation.” Something ridiculous like that, as usual. Thank God, we buried NASRALLAH long ago. But now we have a more serious problem — IRAN, which is firing rockets at us. And even though they claim to be targeting strategic infrastructure, like the refinery in Haifa, in reality, they’re hitting residential neighborhoods. Densely populated areas. To cause civilian casualties, to instill panic, to destabilize the Israeli home front. But you really have to not know us at all to think that would work.

​

GREGORY: On the issue of hostages — you said that it’s impossible to rescue hostages while simultaneously aiming to eliminate HAMAS. That contradicts many fundamental state principles in Israel — that an Israeli life is always the top priority. How did this logic form in your mind?

SERGEY: It’s just common sense. Imagine a criminal has taken a family hostage, and you say to him, “Release the hostages, and then we’ll kill you.” Obviously, he won’t let them go. That’s the same situation here. These are two completely contradictory goals. How can you negotiate with HAMAS for the release of hostages while also publicly declaring that you’re going to destroy HAMAS?

That they must be destroyed — no doubt. Wipe them all out. And I say that as someone who’s not bloodthirsty. But in this case, I’m absolutely for it. Still, we need to be clear about priorities: Is it more important to eliminate HAMAS, or first save the hostages and then figure out how to eliminate HAMAS?

The very fact that this is even a public debate in Israeli society — “Well, 59 people, yes, that’s bad, but it’s not the end of the world; we’ll save 10 million instead” — that fact alone shows something is deeply wrong. The society is sick. That’s what I’d say. Because you can’t even have this discussion. It shouldn’t even be on the table. From the beginning, it was always about the people. That’s what everything was built on — people.

GREGORY: Right.

SERGEY: Always. Soldiers went into battle knowing — alive or dead — we would all return home. And now? It’s like, “Well, it’s just 59 people.” At one meeting, someone told me, “It’s immoral to endanger 10 million people for the sake of 59.” What do you say to that? That those 59 — at least 35 of them are already dead. They’re the ones in danger right now. Those 10 million? Maybe they’ll never face real danger. And the person lecturing me on morality — maybe he’s never even seen a terrorist in real life. But those 59 — they’re in their hands right now, they’re being tortured and killed right now, and we don’t even know how many will survive until a deal is reached — if it’s ever reached. And this guy is talking about morality. When the conversation turns to “big numbers,” that’s when everything collapses. That’s a disaster.

GREGORY: So what should be done in situations like this?

SERGEY: If you want my opinion — make the deal. Free the hostages. And then find a way to destroy HAMAS. Wait until they break the ceasefire — they will.

GREGORY: So the two processes can’t work in parallel?

SERGEY: They are completely contradictory.

GREGORY: Yes, absolutely. And how split is Israeli society on this right now?

SERGEY: Roughly 50/50. I mean, among those who have an opinion. Of course, some people don’t care — there are always people like that. But among those with a stance — about half say, “Save the people at any cost, negotiate.” The other half say, “Finish off HAMAS. And if we manage to save some hostages along the way — great.”

 

Excerpt from Sergey Auslender’s program, June 15 2025:

This morning was important — there were reports that the Iranians are open to negotiations. Apparently, their Deputy Foreign Minister ARAKCHI said, essentially, "We’re not against it," and hinted they might be ready to commit to not acquiring nuclear weapons.

But note — these reports didn’t come from Iranian media. They came from Russian sources. In other words, it was like TASS is authorized to declare… That’s where it all started. And again, over there they’ve got two political camps. The PEZESHKIAN faction is weaker — they’re conservatives too, but more inclined toward dialogue with the West, let’s say. They still want to destroy Israel, but first they’d like to fix the economy.

Then you have the hardcore conservatives, led by SUPREME LEADER KHAMENEI and the IRGC — Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. That group is more like: "Let’s blow up the whole world, build a bomb, end of story." ARAKCHI is aligned with the PEZESHKIAN faction.

But we’ll get into this more soon — we’re planning to bring in a solid journalist in the next few days. We have a few in our circle, we’ll see who’s available, and they’ll explain all of this in detail.

The natural question is: "Wait, what happened? Why are they suddenly willing to talk — was it the magic of those airstrikes?" But the thing is, regardless of whether they agree or not — this regime cannot be trusted. There’s only one way forward — full dismantling. Military or non-military, but in this case, it’s a military dismantling of their nuclear infrastructure. Shut down their path to nuclear weapons completely. Only after that, sure, go ahead and negotiate all you want.

That’s why today TRUMP is making these kinds of statements like, "Yeah, we talked, they’re open to it, maybe give it a little more time," and so on.

There’s also a theory that we’re moving through the so-called stages of escalation — there are six of them. On stage six, the Americans are supposed to step in. According to that theory, they’ll finish the job with their bunker-busting bombs and destroy the underground nuclear facilities in FORDOW, NATANZ, and ISFAHAN once and for all. After that, we can return to negotiations — but on completely different terms.​​​

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